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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
·V-
DAVID EDWARD ALBO , 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15351 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, DAVID EDWARD ALBO, appeals from a conviction 
of Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value in the 
Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, DAVID EDWARD ALBO, was charged with Unlaw-
ful Distribution of a Controled Substance for Value in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(a) (1953 as amended). On the 17th day of 
June, 1977, the appellant was found guilty of the offense as charged 
by a jury. Subsequently, the appellant was sentenced to incarceration 
in the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of zero to ten 
vears . 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and 
judgment rendered below and a remand of the case to the Third 
Judicial District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the afternoon of April 27, 1977, Kayle Shaw, Jr. 
contacted Gayle Lee Boone, appellant's co-defendant, and arranged 
to meet with him later in that day at an establishment called "The 
Gym" (T. 21) . At that time, Shaw was working as an undercover agent 
for the Utah State Liquor and Narcotics Enforcement Division (T. rn). 
Several months earlier Shaw had been released from the Salt Lake Count 
Jail where he was being held pending trial on three counts of Aggravat 
Robbery, felonies of the first degree, and another felony charge of 
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribut 
for Value (T. 20). At the time of this action Shaw was still awaiti~ 
trial on those charges (T. 20). 
Upon being released from jail Shaw reported to Tom CarlesOli 
of the Bountiful City Police Department (T. 80). Carleson then 
introduced Shaw to agents of the State Liquor and Narcotics Control 
Division (T. 81) and then put him to work as an undercover agent (T.11 
At that time Shaw told the State agents that he "wanted to bust Gayle 
Boone" (T. 82) . 
After contacting Boone on April 22, 1977, Shaw contacted 
the State Narcotics Division where he talked to Tom Carleson (T. 26) 
Shaw then proceeded to the Division's office at the Fairgrounds where 
- 2 -
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he was searched (T. 26) and supplied with one thousand dollars worth 
of twenty dollar bills (T. 27). An electronic device was then attached 
to Shaw's body (T. 32). The device transmitted sounds originating in 
the irmnediate area to police radios (T. 33-34). 
Shaw then drove his own car to "The Gym", but he was followed 
there by twelve other agents driving another six cars (T. 174). Shaw 
contacted Boone at "The Gym" (T. 34). Shaw then testified that some 
time later a transaction took place in which he exchanged the 
thousand dollars for a package containing a brown substance (T. 54). 
~en the officers listening to their radios heard a prearranged signal 
from Shaw they arrested Shaw, the appellant and the co-defendant, 
Boone. 
The appellant testified that Boone had phonedthe appellant 
earlier that evening and told the appellant that he was ready to 
repay an old debt (T. 406-408). The appellant testified further that 
he was to meet Boone at "The Gym" where he could collect the money 
(T. 408). When Boone entered the appellant's car and began to count 
out the money owed to the appellant the arrest took place (T. 413). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO DETERMINE THE ADMISSIBILITY 
OF HEARSAY STATEMENTS WHEN THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO ALLOW THEIR ADMISSION UNDER RULE 63(9) 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
The appellant moved to suppress a recording of a conversa-
tion between Gayle Lee Boone and the State's informant, Kayle Shaw, 
1
r (R. 54). The motion was denied and the tape was received into 
- 3 -
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i 
i 
~ I 
II 
I' 
ii 
II 
evidence (T. 333) . The tape was made by recording a broadcast of the, 
' 
conversation transmitted by an electronic device secreted on the 
informant's person (T. 32). The broadcast was heard by some police 
'i1 
officers who had followed and were observing Shaw, although there was. 
a. 
some question about what they heard. 
Kayle Shaw, Jr., the key witness for the prosecution, ;c 
testified about a conversation with the appellant's co-defendant, Gayl 
Lee Boone. In the course of this converation Boone made a number of 11 
statements that tended to incriminate the appellant. The appellant lo 
registered a continuing objection to these statements (T. 22) on the ar 
basis of hearsay because they were offered for the truth of the matt~th 
asserted. The State attempted to have the statements made admissibl1te 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 63 (9) under the theory that the co·ae 
defendant, Boone, and the appellant were engaged in a plan to commit a th, 
crime. 
"Tl 
The hearsay statements which Boone made to Shaw that tende1 th< 
to incriminate the appellant included: Boone's statement that "hislDifei 
hasn't arrived yet" (T. 35). "He. [the man delivering the drugs] shou!c it 
be here in twenty minutes" (T. 36). "He [the same man] should be an 
coIIDD.in' any time" (T. 37). Shaw also testified that Boone said that de] 
"his man" would be driving a "white Continental" and when such a car 
pulled into the parking lot Shaw testified that he asked Boone if evi 
that was "his man" and Boone replied "Yeah" (T. 47). On cross-examini to 
tion Shaw testified that when he arrived at "The Gym" Boone told him a c 
"my boy hasn't arrived" (T. 94) and after Shaw left to eat then retutl 
Boone stated that "he hasn't arrived yet" (T. 97). Shaw testified 
further that Boone had told him that Boone's friend in a white 
- 4 -
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~ontinental did arrive Boone instructed Shaw to wait inside (T. 103). 
[n addition to this testimony, a tape recording of the conversation 
'Jetween Boone and Shaw was admitted into evidence and the jury was 
allowed to hear all of that conversation. All this evidence was 
'1earsay as to the appellant. At trial, Boone refused. to take the stand 
so the appellant was unable to confront him about these statements. 
The only other evidence to connect the appellant with a 
1lan to cormnit a crime is the fact that he drove into the parking 
lot at "The Gym" and parked his car (T. 186), and that when the 
arrest was made the appellant and Boone were in the car with the money 
'that Shaw had given Boone (T. 188). The appellant took the stand and 
1testified that Boone owed him one thousand two hundred dollars (T. 412). 
'He also testifed that Boone had called him earlier that day to tell 
the appellant that he had his money and to come and pick it up at 
"The Gym" (T. 408). Upon arriving at "The Gym" the appellant testified 
1 that Boone approached the car and asked the appellant to wait for a 
'few minutes and when Boone returned with the money and began to count 
1 it out in the appellant's car, both Boone and the appellant were 
arrested (T. 412-413). The appellant stated that he was not Boone's 
delivery boy (T. 414). 
The trial court did not make a finding that the hearsay 
evidence was admissible against the appellant. The court proceeded 
11 to ins true t the jury that if they found that there was a Plan to cormni t 
a crime on the basis of evidence independent of the hearsay, then they 
~ 
- 5 -
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1 
may use Boone's hearsay statements against the appellant (R. 85). .O 
By stipulation of counsel, and with the permission of the court the ;s 
appellant was allowed to take exception to this instruction at the :o 
time for sentencing (T. July 8, 1977, p.2). 
The State contended that these hearsay statements were 
vicarious admissions pursuant to Rule 63(9) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. That rule provides: 
The note 
Vicarious Admissions. As against a party, a state-
ment which would be admissible if made by the declar-
ant at the hearing if (a) the judge finds the declar-
ant is unavailable as a witness and that the statement 
concerned a matter within the scope of an agency 
or employment of the declarant for the party and was 
made before the termination of such relationship, or 
(b) the party and the declarant were participating 
in a plan to comm.it a crime or a civil wrong and 
the statement was relevant to the plan or its sub-
ject matter and was made while the plan was in 
existence and before its complete execution or other 
termination, or (c) one of the issues between the party 
and the proponent of the evidence of the statement 
is a legal liability of the declarant, and the state-
ment tends to establish that liability; 
2 following Rule 63 (7) of the Utah Rules of Evidence express: 
covers Rule 63 (9) and makes the case of State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 36i, 
1. During the course of this trial the Court has received testim:my and evidence 
of conversations between the defendant Gayle Lee Boone and Kayle Shaw Jr. aka 
Mike Days with the a.dm:nition frcm the Court that such testim:my is not to be 
considered as evidence against the co-defendant David Edward Albo. Under the 
rules of evidence of the State of Utah, such testim:my and evidence is hearsay 
unless there bas been evidence presented which proves to your satisfaction, and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the declarant, Gayle Lee Boone, and the co-defend.!nl 
David Edward Albo, were participating in a plan to ccmnit a crime and the statarent 
~ relevant to the plan or its subject matter and was ma.de while the plan ~.ll1 
existence and before its canplete execution or other termination. If you so rwd 
you may consider arI:'f and all statements ma.de by the defendant Boone to Kayle ShaW 
aka Mike Days as substantive evidence against the defendant Albo (R. 85). 
2. This and exceptions (8) and (9) cover the admissibility of admissions by a p~r'.) 
or by those by 'Nhose statements he is b0LU1d. Since "statement" includes non-ver,a-
conduct, the decision in State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285, VX>uld be 
particularly applicable. 
- 6 -
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,0 P.2d 285 (1941), applicable to these hearsay exceptions. In that 
;se the court held that if hearsay is to be admissible against one 
'.O would be a co-planner of a crime under Rule 63 (9) the plan must 
:established independent of statements. The court stated: 
While the declarations of an agent or a conspirator 
may be used against his principal or co-conspirator, 
when that relationship is established by proper 
evidence, agency by reason of being a co-conspirator 
cannot be proved by the declarations of the agent. 
[citations ommitted] 120 P.2d at 310. 
·1e primary reason for requiring this proof independent of the statement 
as given in State v. Erwin, supra, 
[I]t would be begging the question to admit the 
declarations of the agent because he is the agent 
of his principal, and then prove that he was in fact 
the agent of his principal because he so stated in 
his declaration. 12 P.2d at 298. 
'iis was put in a slightly different way in Glasser v. United States, 
j U.S. 60, 86 L.Ed. 680, 62 S.Ct. 457 (1941), 
However, such declarations are admissible over the 
objection of an alleged co-conspirator, who was not 
present when they were made, only if there is proof 
aliunde that he is connected with the conspiracy. 
[citations omitted] Otherwise, hearsay would 
lift itself by its own boot straps to the level of 
competent evidence. 315 U.S. at 74-75. 
Since this is a determination of admissibility of evidence 
:~be made by the trial judge. This requirement is provided in 
:Jle 8 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
:l.!nt 
ent 
~ 
When the qualification of a person to be a witness, 
or the admissibility of evidence, or the existence 
of a privilege is stated in these rules to be subject 
to a condition, and the fulfillment of the condition 
is in issue, the issue is to be determined by ~he 
judge, and he shall indicate to the parties which 
d 
one has the burden of producing evidence and the 
burden of proof on such issue as implied by the rule 
under which the question arises. The judge may hear 
and determine such matters out of the presence or 
- 7 -
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hearing of the jury, except that on the admiss-
ibility of a confession the judge, if requested, 
shall hear and determine the question out of the 
presence and hearing of the jury. But this rule 
shall not be construed to limit the right of a party 
to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to 
weight or credibility. 
The failure of the trial court to make this determination 
as required in the Rules of Evidence obviously was error. However, tol 
make matters worse the trial court compounded the error by instructini a 
the jury that they were to determine the admissibility of the evidence.' 
This very issue was dealt with by the United States Court of Appeals : 
for the Ninth Circuit in the case of Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d t 
718 (9th Cir. 1963). In that case the court held that it is the 
province of the judge to determine the admissibility of the evidence. 
The reason for this is that such an instruction would require that the 
jury find the defendant guilty before considering the evidence. 
In an analogous situation the United States Supreme Court 
held that it is improper to have a jury determine the voluntariness of 
a defendant's confession and then determine the guilt or innocence of 
that defendant. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, (1964). The court fol 
that such a procedure violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The major reasons that the court gave for such a holding wE 
that: First of all, if a jury is to determine the voluntariness of a 
confession it will be impossible to tell if they found that the 
confession was voluntary or involuntary on the record, thus precluding 
appellate review of a defendant's substantial constitutional right. 
3 . See footnote 2, supra. 
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;econdly, the court reasoned that it would be highly possible for a jury 
:o confuse the issues of voluntariness and truthfulness, resulting in 
:he refusal to reject an involuntary confession, which was truthful, 
:hus resulting in a violation of the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment 
1 
rights. Another analogous case is Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 
:o l13 (1968). There the Supreme Court held that if the trial court 
11 aenied a motion to sever and a witness was allowed to testify about 
:e.1tatements the co-defendant made and when that co-defendant did not 
:estify, then the defendant's rights under the confrontation clause of 
l the Sixth Amendment were denied. The court noted that even though the 
;ury was admonished to disregard the statements as to defendant Bruton, 
rrth 
WE 
ng 
The fact of the matter is that too often such 
admonition against misuse is intrinsically inef-
fective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible 
declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the 
jurors. The admonition therefore becomes a futile 
collocation of words and fails of its purpose as a 
legal protection to defendants against whom such 
a declaration should not tell. 
The government should not have the windfall of 
having the jury be influenced by evidence against 
defendant which, as a matter of law, they should 
not consider but which they cannot put out of 
their minds. 391 U.S. at 129 quoting Delli Paoli 
v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957). Frankfurter 
J. dissenting. 
With these considerations in mind - the possibility that 
a jury will be confused by refusing to disregard what they may decide 
:obe truthful statements, and their inability to not consider such 
statements should they choose to find the statements inadmissible -
chis instruction was erroneous. 
These errors were prejudicial, mandating a reversal of 
:'1e judgment below. This is because the hearsay statements were 
- 9 -
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inadmissible against the appellant and in all likelihood the statementi~ 
were used as evidence against the appellant. All the evidence which :.2< 
could prove a plan to commit a crime which is independent of the hea1.:n ~ 
say statements is outlined above. The most damaging of this evidence 1ad 
is Boone being in the appellant's car giving him the money. The appel]1ef1 
testified that Boone was repaying a previous debt, absent the hearsay md 
statements this evidence goes unrefuted. Even if the jury chose to 'ei 
disregard the appellant's testimony, the fact that the two men were in:ac 
the car with the money makes the State's contention that they were :en 
dividing the gains of a drug sale nothing more than mere suspicion. :he 
"Evidenc.e which creates a mere suspicion of guilt as not enough. Guilt~ns 
may not be inferred from mere association", Glover v. United States, :he 
306 F.2d 594 (10th Cir., 1962). Similarly, in White v. State, 451 Jef 
S. W. 2d 497 (Tex. 1970), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that J\e 
the evidence was insufficient to make a prima facie showing of possessr•h< 
of narcodic paraphernalia. The evidence, independent of the co-defenda1st 
hearsay statement was that White had thrown two capsules of heroin on :o· 
the roof when he saw the police approach his apartment, and when the 
paraphernalia for which he was charged with possessing was removed from:hi 
a bathroom he shared and was displayed to White, he stated "That's my 10' 
stuff". Such evidence is much more inculpatory than two men being 
present in a car with money after a narodics sale. This is because 
there was an admission of ownership and the paraphernalia was in a 
area within the defendant's control. Even if the evidence of the two 
in the car with the money is taken in conjunction with the evidence 
that the appellant drove into the parking lot shortly before the 
transaction, it is not sufficient to establish that there was a plan 
to commit a crime. This is because mere association, United Stat~ 
~n 
:h 
:h 
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nti~· 497 F. 2d 130 (5th Cir., 1974) or presence, People v. Braly, 532 
:.2d 325 (Colo., 1975) is insufficient to establish a prima facie case. 
n United States v. Oliva, supra, there was evidence that the defendant 
ar• 
e ·,ad followed a co-conspirator into a parking lot of an apartment shortly 
en1efore a drug sale took place' waited while the transaction took place' 
md attempted to drive away when he realized the co-conspirator was 
:eing arrested. This was held to be insufficient to establish the prima 
in :acie showing required for the admission of the co-conspirator's state-
:ents against the defendant. In People v. Braly, supra, agents observed 
:he defendant enter a house where a drug sale was set up. The agents 
ilt~nside the house were told to wait in another room at the same time when 
:here was a knock on the door. That knock corresponded to the 
Jefendant' s entering the house as observed by the agents outside 
at :he co-defendant then produced some narcotics to sample for the agents 
ssr•ho were in the house. This evidence was held to be insufficient to 
nda1stablish the prima facie showing required for the admission of the 
n :o-defendant' s statements against the defendant. The evidence in the 
:ase at hand is analogous to the evidence in those cases just described. 
rom:he appellant was in the area but nobody saw any drugs passed between 
Joane and the appellant. Kayle Shaw never spoke with the appellant, 
~n fact he did not even know the appellant's name (T. 121), and finally, 
:he agents never saw Boone approach the appellant's car until the arrest 
;as made. 
Therefore, there was not even a prima facie showing that 
:he appellant had formed a plan to commit a crime. Absent this showing 
:.1e evidence was inadmissible as to the appellant. It was error for 
~ court to allow the jury to consider this evidence against the 
- 11 -
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appellant in any way, let alone in the erroneous way in which the court de 
instructed the jury. The hearsay statements were the most damaging i 1 
evidence that the State had against the appellant. As shown above, 
without these statements the State could not even make a prima facie 
showing that there was a plan to distribute narcodics for value. There ir 
is a high probability that without this evidence the jury's verdict de 
would have been different, State v. Simmons, 573 P.2d 341 (Utah, 1977) Ur 
The errors were prejudicial, the case must be reversed and remanded to fc 
the Third District Court for a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT UNDER THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE WAS DENIED WHEN THE TRIAL 
COURT ALLOWED THE JURY TO DETERMINE THE ADMISSIBILITY 
OF THE CO-DEFENDANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENTS AFTER THE 
COURT HAD DENIED APPELLANT ' S MOTION TO SEVER THE TRIALS. 
nE 
ar 
st 
or 
cc 
Appellant, who was tried jointly with Gayle Lee Boone, file tr 
a pre-trial motion to sever based on the Confrontation Clause of Articl tr 
I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah and the Sixth Amendment of tc 
the United States Constitution as that clause is interpreted in ~ p< 
v. United States, supra. The motion was denied (R. 48). pe 
The facts relevant here are that Kayle Shaw, Jr. testified fi 
that the co-defendant Boone made statements that implicated the appelli 
The most cruicial of these statements were that the person who would be ag 
delivering the narcodics would be driving a "white Continental" and whe cc 
such a car pulled into the lot the co-defendant identified the appellan tr 
for Shaw (T. 47). The appellant registered a continuing objection to tr 
the admission of these statements (T. 22). The court did not make anv tr 
- 12 -
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determination on the admissibility of these statements, rather that 
issue was left to the jury (R. 85). 
The impropriety of this instruction and its effect on the 
appellant are discussed in detail in Point I, supra. The impropriety 
e in having a jury determine the voluntariness of a confession then 
determine guilt or innocence, was ruled on by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Jackson v. Denno, supra. In that case, the court gave 
four reasons why it is improper to have a jury determine the voluntari-
ness of a confession. As can be seen by their content, these reasons 
apply equally well to having the jury determine the admissibility of 
any kind of evidence. The reasons are as follows: The content of the 
statements at issue may affect the jury's consideration on admissibility 
on appeal, there is no record to indicate whether the jury found the 
confessions to be admissible or inadmissible; if the jury did find 
e the evidence to be inadmissible, then it would be unsound to believe 
1 that guilt is reliably determined; and the jury may find it difficult 
to understand the policy forbidding reliance on statements of other 
parties. To sum up these reasons, there is a danger that notions 
pertaining to the guilt of a defendant will infect the jury's 
finding of the admissibility of the evidence. 
Normally, the questions of the admissibility of hearsay 
ie against a co-defendant and the need to grant a severance are not of 
ie constitutional magnitude. But when it is a co-defendant who has made 
in the statement that is admissible against himself, but not against 
the other co-defendant and that first co-defendant does not testify, 
then a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
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Amendment and under Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of 
Utah are violated, Bruton v. United States, supra. 
In Bruton v. United States, supra, the confession of the 
co-defendant was found to be inadmissible against Bruton by the trial 
court. The trial court instructed the jury not to consider the con-
fession against Bruton. The co-defendant refused to take the stand 
and Bruton claimed that his Sixth Amendment rights under the Confronta 
tion Clause had been denied. The court began its analysis by citing 
Pointer v. Texas,380 U.S. 400 (1965) for the proposition, 
'That the right of cross-examination is 
included in the right of an accused in a 
criminal case to confront the witnesses against 
him' [which is] secured by the Sixth Amendment. 
391 U.S. at 126. 
The major reason for the confrontation clause, the court noted, is to 
give a defendant charged with a crime an opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses against him. This reasoning was followed in Douglas v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). In that case the prosecutor read into 
evidence the purported confession of a person charged in the same 
incident but tried separately after that witness had exercised his 
privilege against self incrimination. The court held that effective 
confrontation is possible only if a statement is affirmed by the 
speaker. 
After noting that the Confrontation Clause requires that 
a defendant have the right to cross-examine witnesses against him, th< 
court in Bruton v. United States, supra, held that under certain 
circumstances, as in the case at hand, it is not reasonably possible' 
a jury to follow the court's instructions. The court found that an 
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instruction does not wipe the effect of an admission by one co-defendant 
:rom the juror's minds when they are considering the guilt or innocence 
if a second co-defendant. Because of this, the admonition becomes 
1othing more than a futile collection of words. The court then held 
chat the government should not have the windfall of having the jury 
~fluenced by evidence against the defendant which the jurors should 
-iot consider, but which the jurors cannot put out of their minds. 
The court then analogized the problem with admissions by 
a co-defendant to the determination of the voluntariness of a confession 
as was ruled as in Jackson v. Dermo, supra. The court found that it 
is harder to disregard an admission by a co-defendant in a joint trial 
than it is for a jury to disregard a confession found to be involuntary. 
The reasoning the court gave for this was: The involuntary confession 
is out of the case, but the co-defendant's admission is still admissible, 
because the statement is admissible for only limited purposes, it must 
still enter into the jury's deliberations; it is very difficult for 
the trained lawyer, let alone for jurors to perform the mental gymnastics 
required to separate the evidence into separate intellectual boxes; and 
f~thermore, the jurors will have an even greater problem separating 
'the truthfulness of a statement and its application to a co-defendant 
'.han in the voluntary confession determiantion when truthfulness is not 
to be considered. 
In the case at hand there are even stronger reasons to find 
that the appellant's rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated. 
'.o!'ne same considerations of the statements being admissible against the 
~-defendant Boone and the problems the jury would have disregarding 
'.iese statements with respect to the appellant are all present here 
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as they were in Bruton v. United States, supra. But these problems 
are compounded by the error in instructing the jury and all of the 
Jackson v. Denno, supra, problems that are inherent in such an instructiia 
These problems are summarized by Justice Brennan in his 
majority opinion in Bruton v. United States, supra, 
Nevertheless, as was recognized in Jackson v. 
Denno, supra, there are some contexts in which 
tne'"""risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow 
instructions is so great, and the consequences of 
failure so vital to the defendant, that the 
practical and human limitations of the jury sys-
tem cannot be ignored. [citations ommitted] 
Such a context is presented here, where the 
powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements 
of a co-defendant, who stands accused side-by-
side with the defendant, are deliberately spread 
before the jury in a joint trial. Not only are th 
the incriminations de-vastating to the defendant 
but their credibility is inevitably suspect, a fact de 
recognized when accomplices do take the stand 
and the jury is instructed to weigh their Br 
testimony carefully given the recognized motivation 
to shift blame onto others. The unreliability re 
of such evidence is intolerably compounded when 
the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify ha1 
and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It was 
against such threats to a fair trial that the te: 
Confrontation Clause was directed. 
[Citation anitted, footnotes ommitted] 391 U.S. at in 
135-136. 
thE 
Since the error in this case was of a constitutional 
Svi 
magnitude, it is presumed to be prejudicial unless the State is able t: 
pri 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute tot~ 
appellant's conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
See also, State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 P. 2d 639 (1970); anc 
State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186 (Utah, 1977). The reasonable d0ubt that 
the error was harmless is found in the erroneous instruction given tc 
the jury and the high probability that the jury was unable to follow 
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it, see Point I, supra. The judgment of the court below must be 
reversed and the case remanded to the Third District Court for the 
1appellant to receive a new trial, separate from any charges against 
~e co-defendant, Boone. 
POINT III 
BY REFUSING TO REQUIRE A WITNESS' FORMER ATTORNEY 
TO TESTIFY AFTER THE ATTORNEY CLAIMED THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR BECAUSE A CLIENT'S PLAN TO COMMIT 
PERJURY IS EXCEPTED FROM THAT PRIVILEGE. 
In the course of Kayle Shaw's testimony it was established 
that he had three charges of aggravated robbery, felonies of the first 
degree, pending against him (T. 20). It was also established that 
kadley P. Rich of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association had 
represented Shaw on these charges (T. 74). Shaw testified that he 
1ad retained private counsel whom he had just fired (T. 74). Shaw also 
testified that he never stated that he was willing to perjure himself 
in trial on the aggravated robbery charges (T. 362). Mr. Rich claimed 
the attorney-client privilege pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence (T. 364). The court allowed Mr. Rich to claim the 
privilege for Shaw (T. 364). 
There is no question that the assertion of the privilege 
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4 
fit within the general rule described in Rule 26(1) of the Utah is 
Rules of Evidence. However, the privilege may not be properly claimed is 
if it fits within the exceptions applicable to that rule. The Cot 
important exception here is is Rule 26(2)(a) which provides: 
Such privileges shall not extend (a) to a communication 
if the judge finds that sufficient evidence, aside 
from the communication, has been introduced to warrant 
a finding that the legal service was sought or obtained 
in order to enable or aid the clinet to commit or plan 
to commit a crime or a tort. 
It is obvious that in order to assert this exception "the secret must 
be told in order to be kept," but this is a reasonable method of re-
conciling the competing policies of the attorney-client privilege and 
20: 
att 
an 
thE 
thE 
the 
anc 
cot 
the search for truth in a trial, A v. District Court of Second Judicia: 
District, 550 P.2d 315 (Colorado, 1976). 
5 Since perjury is a crime in Utah , the plan to cotm:nit perj 
4. General Rllle. Subject to Rllle 37 and except as otherwise provided by paragraphl 
of this rule camruni.cations found by the judge to have been between lawyer and his 
client in the course of that relationship and in professional confidence, are priviJ 
and such a client has a privilege (a) if he is the witness to refuse to disclose aI11 
such camruni.cation, and (b) to prevent his lawyer from disclosing it, and (c) to p!1I 
any other witness from disclosing such ccmrunication if it caire to the knowledge of 
such witness (i) in the course of its transmittal between the client and the lawyer 
or (ii) in a manner not reasonably to be anticipated by the client, or (iii) as a r~ 
of a breach of the lawyer-client relationship. The privilege may be claimed by the 
client in person or by his lawyer, or if incanpetent, by his guardian, or if dece4Saj 
by his personal representative. The privilege available to a corporation or assoc~ 
tenn:inates upon dissolution. ' 
5. 76-8-502. False or inconsistent material statements. - A person is guilty ofi 
felony of the second degree if in any official proceeding: 
(1) He makes a false material statement under oath or affirmation 
or swears or affirms the truth of a material statement previously made and he does 
not believe the statement to be true· or 
(2) He makes inconsist~t mater.-al statements under oath or affi.r!!atin 
bc;>th within the period of limitations, one of which is false and not believed by 131 
him to be true. In a prosecution under this section, it need not be alleged or 
proved which or the statemmts is false but only that one or the other was false of 
and not believed by the defendant to be true. 
in 
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is covered by Rule 26 (2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, such a plan 
lis not privileged. The only previous occasion that the Utah Supreme 
Court has had to rule in this question was in People v. Mahon, 1 Utah 
205 (1875). In that case, the defendant claimed error because an 
a: 
rj 
11 
::. 
:11 
:~ 
! 
~ 
I 
attorney was required to testify about a plan to commit forgery because 
an attorney was required to testify about a plan to commit forgery that 
the defendant had consulted that attorney about. The court held that 
the attorney' client privilege could not be asserted. The court stated 
the general rule that "confidential communications between the attorney 
and client are not to be revealed at any time" 1 Utah at 208, the 
court then reasoned: 
But do all matters come within the scope of professional 
employment? Are there not matters of such a nature, 
that the law will not permit the relation of Attorney and 
Client to exist in regard to them? While a member of the 
Bar may be Counsel for, and keep the secrets of, one who 
has committed a crime, can he be permitted to sustain 
any such relation to one who proposes to commit a crime? 
Where he to attempt to give aid and assistance, in the 
case last approved, would not the law regard him as an 
accessory before the fact, rather than as a Counselor 
at Law? Is it not the duty of a member of the Bar, as 
much as of any other citizen, to expose contemplated 
crime, so as, if possible, to prevent it? What do the 
books say? 
Lord Chief Baron Gilbert says: "Where the original 
ground of communication is malum in se, as if he be 
consulted on an intention to commit a forgery or per-
jury, this can never be included within the compass 
of professional confidence; being equally contrary to 
his duty in his profession, his duty as a citizen, and 
as a man." (1 Gilbert's Law of Ev. 277). 1 Utah at 209. 
More recently, in State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 
136 (1970), the Supreme Court of Kansas found there was no violation 
of the attorney-client privilege when the court-appointed attorney 
informed the Court that his client was uncooperative and planned to 
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I 
I 
L 
commit perjury. The court held: 
We perceive nothing violative of the confidentiality 
inherent in the attorney-client relation by Mr. 
Anderson's making known to the court defendant's 
avowed intention of presenting perjured testimony. 
While as a general rule counsel is not allowed to 
disclose information imparted to him by his client 
or acquired during their professional relation, 
unless authorized to do so by the client himself 
[citation omitted] the announced intention of a 
client to commit perjury, or any other crime is 
not included within the confidences which an 
attorney is bound to respect. 468 P.2d at 141. 
This evidence was obviously admissible because its purpose 
was to impair the credibility of a witness 6 and in the course of his 
7 testimony that witness had denied making such a statement (T. 72) . 
Consequently it was error for the court to allow Mr. Rich to assert ti 
attorney-client privilege, thus preventing the appellant from effecti~ 
impeaching the credibility of the State's primary witness. 
The error was prejudicial because there is a reasonable 
probability that if it had not been commited there would have been a 
result more favorable to the appellant, State v. Simmons, supra. Thi; 
is because the defense was that the co-defendant did not sell the nar· 
cotics to Kayle Shaw, rather, he was collecting a past debt from Shaw 
and using that money to repay the appellant. In order to do this it 
was crucial that Shaw was shown to be a person who's testimony compl:I 
lacked even a modicum of credibility. To do this it was of the utmos: 
6. Rule 20 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: Subject to Rules 21 and 22, for the~ 
of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party including the ix:· 
calling him may examine him and introduce extrinsic evidence concerniilg any stater.:: 
of conduct by him and any other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility. 
7. Rule 22(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Extrinsic evidence of prior contradi~· 
tory statements, 'Whether oral or written ma.de bv the witness mav in the discretl'· 
of the judge be excluded unless the witn~ss was ~o examined whlle. testifying as tc 
give him an opportunity to identify, explain or deny the statement. · 
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~ortance that the appellant be able to show that Shaw was willing 
0 perjury himself. After making this showing the inference could be 
ade that Shaw was willing to lie under oath; therefore, he would be 
tore than willing to lie about buying drugs from the appellant, that 
nference may have been enough to create a reasonable doubt of the 
1ppellant' s guilt in the minds of the jurors. The error was 
1rejudicial, absent this error there is a reasonable probability that 
he verdict may have been more favorable. The judgment must be reversed 
md the case remanded to the Third District Court for a new trial. 
POINT IV 
THE FAILURE TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL TO ALLOW THE 
APPELLANT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF A CRUICIAL 
WITNESS DENIED THE APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO COMPUL-
SORY PROCESS FOR WITNESSES AS GUARANTEED IN THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH. 
In the course of re-direct examination the prosecutor elicited 
the following testimony with respect to the aggravated robbery charges 
that the witness, Kayle Shaw, was facing at the time: 
Q. And what was the name of your lawyer at that time? 
A. Carolyn Nichols. 
Q. And did you have personal contact with her at that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And why did you discharge her at that time? 
A. She was defending Louis Rashado, somebody I had set up. 
Q. Has Mr. Rashada been charged with the distribution of 
narcotics also? 
A. Yes. 
- 21 -
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Q. And she is representing him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there any other reason that you fired her other 
than this conflict of interest? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what's that? 
A. Because I thought she would be a setup because she 
has been talking to Mr. Boone and several other people. 
Q. Did she inform you of that? 
A. Yes. (T. 142) 
On re-cross examination, defense counsel established that 
Shaw and his attorney were the only persons present when the witness 
decided that she was going to set him up (T. 154). Shaw also denied 
that his attorney had accused him of lying to set people up (T. 155) 
It was also established that the subject matter of these conversation: 
would affect the determination of the guilt or innocence of the appeL 
and of the co-defendant, Boone (T. 155). Kayle Shaw then expressly 
waived any privilege he had with respect to the confidentiality of 
these communications with his attorney (T. 164). All of this testimorJ 
was taken on Wednesday, June 15, 1977. The next day, Thursday, June 
16, 1977, defense counsel moved for a continuance until Monday, June 
20, 1977 (T. 401). The basis for the motion was to secure the attend~ 
of Carolyn Nichols, the attorney with whom Kayle Shaw had the afore· 
mentioned conversation. Ms. Nichols was in Texas and therefore 
unavailable until June 20, 1977 (T. 401). The motion was denied (T . .J 
after arguments the jury retired for their deliberations on the 
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afternoon of Friday, June 17, 19 77 . 
In Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66 (Alaska, 1976), the 
)upreme Court of Alaska ruled on a situation which was the same as that 
:n the case at hand. There the defendant was convicted of first degree 
~rder by running over a person in a car. The car was then set on fire. 
Tue next day the defendant pointed the car out to a friend while they 
·1ere driving in the area. The two of them then removed some articles 
from the burned out car. The state's theory was that the defendant 
\new where the car was and directed his friend to it. The friend 
testified that he did not see the car at the place where the defendant 
.t saw it. 
The defendant in that case disclaimed any knowledge of 
the homicide, and testified that he could see the burned out car from 
·the road. Since the wreckage had been moved, a police officer who 
m: conducted the investigation was called by the defendant to give the 
{,exact location of where the car was found and he testified that it 
could be seen from the road. The officer's attendance could not be 
secured immediately because he was out of town and was unable to fly 
10
'lto the location of the trial due to bad whether. The trial was con-
~ tinued for one day, but the weather did not break and the court refused 
! to grant any further continuances and the trial was concluded. The 
id~ defendant was convicted as charged. After analyzing a great number 
of cases, the Alaska Court found seven factors that must be met before 
a court grants a mid-trial continuance to secure the attendance of a 
.J.' <ltness. These factors are: 
1 d b . 1 8 . The evi ence must e materia ; 
Requirement given in State v. Hartman, 101 Utah 298, 119 P.2d 112 (1941). 
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2. The evidence cannot be elicited from any other source; 
3. The evidence must not be cumulative; 
4. It is probable that the witness can be secured in a 
reasonable time; 
5. There will be little inconvenience to the court and t~ 
others; 
6. The requesting party must have acted dilligently and 
in good faith to secure the attendance of that witness; 9 and 
7. There is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony 
f I d' 10 would a feet the jury s ver ict. 
The Alaska Court found that all these factors were present. On that 
basis the court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to hai 
compulsory process was denied because he was not allowed to call favor 
able witnesses, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
The materiality of the testimony that Ms. Nichols would 
give was established by Kayle Shaw. He stated the knowledge that Ms 
Nichols had would probably affect the determination of the guilt or 
innocence of the appellant (T. 155). Furthermore, such evidence wouli 
be considered for substantive purposes rather than for simply assessii 
Shaw's credibility, as is made clear in the note following Rule 63(1) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
9. Requirement given in State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 P.447 (1906). 
10. This is the general standard for prejudice, State v. S:imzvns, supra. 
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Shaw also testified that he and Ms. Nichols were the only 
?ersons present during the course of the conversation (T. 154). 
Consequently, there were no alternative sources of information. 
Ms. Nichols' testimony would not have been cummulative. 
There had been no showing that Shaw had made other prior inconsistent 
statements. By allowing Mr. Rich to claim the attorney-
client privilege the court has previously prevented the 
appellant from showing that Shaw had made such state-
men ts. 
The witness could have been served a subpoena in a reason-
able time. As noted above the appellant made the request on Thursday, 
June 16, 1977; the witness would have been available on Monday, June 
,JQ, 1977. Since the courts are not open on Saturday and Sunday, Friday, 
June 17, 1977, would have been the only day that the trial would have 
to have been continued. What amounts to a one day delay is hardly 
mreasonable. The reasonableness of this delay is reinforced if this 
11 
court takes judicial notice, pursuant to Rules 9 
11. Rule 9: (1) Judicial notice shall be taken without request by a party, of the 
1camm law, constitution and public statutes in force in this state, and of such 
specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge as are so universally 
'mcwn that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute. 
(2) Judicial notice may be taken without request by a party, of (a) the 
'.lllIIDn law, constitution and public statutes of every other state, territory and 
Jurisdiction of the United States, and (b) private acts and resolutions of the Congress 
of the United States and of the legislature of this state, and duly enacted ordinances 
and duly published orders, rules and regulations of governJ:1E1.tal subdivisions or depart-
lEnts or agencies of this state (and duly published orders, rules and regulations of 
the departments or agencies of the United States), and (c) the laws of foreign countries, 
and (d) such facts as are so generally known or of such COIIIIDI1 notoriety within the 
t:intorial jurisdiction of the court that they carmot reasonably be the sub~ect of 
Gi.spute, and (e) specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge which are 
:aiiable of imrediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources 
'f indisputable accuracy. 
(3) Judicial notice shall be taken of each matter specified in paragraph 
') of this rule if a party requests it, and (a) furnishes the judge suffic~ent 
J\l:onnauon to enable him properly to canply with the request and (b) has given each 
idverse party such notice as the judge may require to enable the adverse party to 
l\'epare to m:et the request . 
..... 
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and 12(3) 12 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the fact that it is a : 
common practice in the Third Judicial District to continue a trial f::1t 
Thursday to Monday if the judge hearing the case is to take the arrai;:.:, 
ment and sentencing calendar on Friday. 
These same considerations apply to the inconvenience tha: 
a continuance over a Friday would cause to the court and to others. 
In Salazar v. State, supra, this consideration was weighed against 
the possible prejudice to the defendant's substantive rights. The 
rights involved here as were involved in Salazar v. State, supra, an: 
the appellant's Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process of Law as 
that clause applies the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amend· 
ment of the United State's Constitution to the states and the rights 
guaranteed in Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah. 
Unquestionably, a one day delay does not so seriously affect the neec i 
for efficiency and prompt disposition of criminal cases that these 
substantive rights must be denied. 
Also, there is no question that the appellant acted dill::~ 
and in good faith in trying to secure the attendance of the witnes; 
An attempt to subpoena Ms. Nichols was made on the same afternoon oii 
date that Kayle Shaw testifed and the need for Ms. Nichols to testif; 
was made apparent (T. 401). The continuance was requested the day 
following the attempt to subpoena Ms. Nichols. It hardly would have 
been possible for the appellant to act more dilligently in trying tc 
secure the attendance of this witness. 
Finally, there is a reasonable likelihood that the testi:-~ 
would have affected the jury's verdict. As has previously been arg-;::. 
by preventing the appellant from challenging the credibility of Ka:< 
12. Rule 12(3): The reviewing court in its discretion may take judicial notice 
of lrI'J mtter specified in Rule 9 whether or not judicially noticed by the judge 
___,,,,,,. 
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Shaw the trial court denied the appellant his only defense; that being 
;1rhat Kayle Shaw had liked about buying drugs from the co-defendant and 
:.:;as repaying the co-defendant for an old debt which the co-defendant 
,as to repay to the appellant. The prior inconsistent statements would 
allow the jury to see that Shaw must have been lying in making at least 
one of the inconsistent statements and from this, the jury may infer 
chat Shaw was lying about buying narcotics. The evidence would also 
:iave been considered substantively in determining the guilt or innocence 
: of the appellant. Obviously, there is a reasonable doubt that this 
:estimony may have been harmless, Chapman v. California, supra. 
Since all the factors delineated in Salazar v. State, supra, 
have been met in the case at hand, the appellant has been denied his 
right to call favorable witnesses as required by the compulsory process 
: clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah. Washington v. Texas, 
supra. The judgment and verdict must be reversed and the case remanded 
::Ho the Third District Court for a new trial. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
ALLOWING THE STATE TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF OTHER 
BAD ACTS BY THE CO-DEFENDANT. 
In the course of the direct examination of Kayle Shaw, Jr. 
'.he prosecutor elicited statements that connected the co-defendant, 
;avle Boone, with other bad acts and statements that disparaged the 
:.~:a-defendant's character (T. 39, 140 and 142). At no time did the 
~~-defendant introduce any evidence about his character. 
On direct examination of Shaw by the prosecutor, the 
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following exchange took place: 
Q. So this conversation took place over about forty 
minutes? 
A. About forty minutes. 
Q. Did you have any conversation with Boone - Mr. Boone 
about purchasing any other narcotics from him? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. About what time did that take place in the course of 
these conversations? 
A. About ten to seven. 
Q. And what did that consist of? 
A. Angel Dust. 
Q. And just tell me what you said and what he said. 
A. He told me he st;l~ ha& an ounce of Angel Dust down 
in his crib. 
Q. Now, can you translate that for us what "an ounce of 
Angel Dust in his crib" means? 
MR. KELLER: Your Honor, at this point I am going to 
interpose an objection. I have a motion to make outside 
the presence of the Jury. I ask the Court allow us to 
do so at this time. 
As counsel for the co-defendant pointed out and as is re· 
fleeted in the record, a mistrial had been granted the day before thi> 
exchange on the basis that Shaw had volunteered a statement on cross· 
examination that he had purchased narcotics from the co-defendant pri:I 
to the date of the purchase that is the subject of this case (T. 40, 
R. 50). 
Later, in redirect examination of Shaw by the prosecutor 
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~e following exchange took place: 
Q. Could you have made the buy from Mr. Boone on the 
27th had you told him the truth that you were working 
as an undercover agent? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. You couldn't - I said, could you have bought from him? 
A. If I told him? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. I doubt if I would be alive right now. 
MR. KELLER: Your Honor, I object to the response. It's 
unresponsive. It's unduly prejudicial. I have a motion 
to make outside the presence of the Jury and I would ask 
the Court to allow me to do that at the proper recess. 
THE COURT: Very well. The objection is sustained and the 
answer is stricken and the Jury admonished to disregard the 
answer of the witness. (T. 140) 
Later in redirect examination the prosecutor elicited a statement from 
Shaw that he had fired his attorney because she was working with the 
co-defendant and she said the co-defendant was going to set Shaw up 
(T. 142). Out of the presence of the jury a motion for a mistrial was 
denied (T. 146) . 
With respect to the first statement about the co-defendant 
possessing other drugs, there was a motion for a mistrial that was 
>denied (T. 45). In denying the motion the court seemed to indicate 
that it was improper for the statement to be elicited, but he felt 
:Hhat the evidence was not prejudicial (T. 43, 45), the same basis was 
~~n for the second motion for a mistrial (T. 146). The Court 
did not give any instruction to disregard the statement when the jury 
ad returned (T. 46, 147). 
The standard for the trial court to use in determining 
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when a mistrial should be granted is given in Justice Maughan's 
dissenting opinion in State v. Maestas, 560 P.2d 343 (Utah 1977). 
test is: 
Upon a motion for mistrial the court must weigh the dang 
of prejudice, to the defense, against the practicability 
of reducing or eliminating that danger by choosing a 
new jury. The essence of judicial discretion in dealing 
with a misadventure is to so manage matters so as to 
control the danger of jury prejudice, to the extent 
practicable [footnote omitted], 560 P.2d at 346, Maughan 
J. dissenting. 
As for the danger of prejudice, the factors to consider 
are whether statements as a whole cast the co-defendant and appellan 
in a bad light. The statements about other drugs and firing his 
attorney appear to have been elicited intentionally. Those statement 
were never stricken and the jury was not instructed to disregard then 
Finally, it must be remembered that the statements were made duringt 
testimony of the first witness. 
Evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs is inadmissible 
unless it fits within one of the exceptions to that rule. Rule 55 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence is the codification of that rule. It 
provides: 
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person committed a 
crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is 
inadmissible to prove his dispostion to commit crime 
or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that he 
committed another crime or civil wrong on another 
specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, 
such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some 
other material fact including absence of mistake or 
accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge or identity. 
The only exceptions that fit this case would be to prove intent or 
plan. Both the intent and plan in the case at hand were to distribute 
a controlled substance for value. The statement that the co-defendar' 
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was in possession of a different type of substance has little or no 
he probative value in the case at hand. It only shows that the co-defendant 
was allegedly violating the law allowing the jury to infer on the 
er basis of the co-defendant's bad character that he made the sale in the 
case at hand. Under Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence such evidence 
is clearly inadmissible. With respect to the second remark, admittedly 
the court did all that it could to reduce its prejudicial nature. 
~evertheless, the jury did hear the remark and its resulting prejudice 
~st be considered in conjuction with the previous remark. The sub-
stance of the final remark is that the co-defendant is interfering 
with Shaw's right to counsel. This does nothing but cast the appellant 
t> 
in a bad light as the statement would not be admissible for any purpose 
m. 
ooder Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
tn• 
The case law provides examples of when statements are so 
prejudicial in and of themselves to require the reversal of a case 
on appeal. Evidence that the defendant had been charged with a crime 
in the past, even though never tried on the charge is prejudicial error, 
State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961). Testimony about 
a prior arrest for a similar crime than was charged required reversal, 
State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P. 2d 407 (1963). Since the statement 
here involved acts that were illegal and somewhat related to the 
charge in the case at hand they were just as prejudicial as the remarks 
in State v. Dickson, supra, and State v. Kazda, supra. 
Another factor that substantially contributes to the preju-
dicial nature of the remarks was that some of them had been intentionally 
re elicited from the witness. This is easily seen by the context in which 
' -~ey were raised, (T. 39, 142) and the prosecutor's arguments to make 
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the statement admissible (T. 40-41, 42-43, 144-145). The rule given 
by this court is that a mistrial is to be granted when the prosecutor a 
intentionally elicits inadmissible statements from a witness. In 
State v. Hartman, 101 Utah 298, 119 P. 2d 112 (1941), this Court statei, t 
Were it shown to be an attempt to get in evidence the 
prejudicial reference to another crime, such purpose 
might well have moved the court to declare a mistrial 
not only on the ground of prejudice but as a proper 
disapproval of such tactics. 
This rule is followed in State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 01 
323 (1955); and in State v. Case, 547 P.2d 221 (Utah, 1976). The l< 
State cannot claim that the prosecutor lacked notice. This is because WE 
a mistrial had been granted on the previous day because Shaw had made ti 
a statement about another drug purchase from the co-defendant. It ti 
is quite obvious that evidence of a prior sale is much more probative be 
of the intent or plan to sell narcotics then a statement ab out presen: 
possession of narcotics or that the co-defendant had interfered with a 
the witness' relationship with his attorney. 
There was further prejudice because the court failed to 
instruct the jury to disregard the first and third statements (T. 46, 
147). Without an instruction of that nature the evidence is left in 
for the jury's consideration, State v. St. Clair, supra. Such an insiiJ 
tion also tends to cure the prejudcial nature of the statement, ~ 
v. Hartman, supra; State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 36 7, 517 P. 2d 1322 (Jll 
The final factor that contributed to the prejudicial nature 
of the statements was the time at which they were elicited. 
The first was elicited in the first several hours of test'.· 
mony (T. 39). The second and third statements came on the morning o: 
the second day of trial. Since they came at times when relatively 
- 32 -
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little other information had been given to the jury, the appellant 
r and co-defendant were cast in a bad light from the outset. The prejudice 
attaching to the co-defendant also applies to the appellant because 
ed, the court instructed the jury to apply the co-defendant's statements 
against the appellant should the jury find they were engaged in a plan 
to commit a crime (R. 85). 
When all of these factors are taken together, the nature 
of the statements, the intentional eliciting of the statements, the 
lack of an instruction from the court and the time in the trial when they 
1se were made, all add up to their being substantially prejudicial. Since 
le the statements were made so early in the trial - both were made by 
the very first witness - the inconvenience of a mistrial would have 
•e been minimal. The trial court should have granted a mistrial. 
~nt The standard for review of an erroneous failre to grant 
1 a mistrial was given in State v. Hodges, supra. In that case this 
Court stated: 
I, 
I 
istiJ 
:e 
:ure 
;t'.· 
Nevertheless, the processes of justice should not be 
distorted simply for the purpose of censuring a mistake. 
The critical inquiry should be whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the incident so prejudiced 
the jury that in its absence there might have been a 
different result. Due to his advantaged position and 
consistent with his responsibilities as the authority 
in charge of the trial, the inquiry is necessarily 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 
He should view such an episode in the light of the 
of the total proceeding, and if he thinks that there 
has been such prejudice that there is a reasonable 
probability that the defendant cannot have a fair and 
impartial determination of his guilt or innocence, he 
should of course grant a mistrial. But inasmuch ~s 
this is his primary responsibility, when he has.given 
due consideration and ruled upon the matter, this 
court on review should not upset his ruling unless 
it clearly appears that he has abused his discretion. 
[footnotes omitted] 517 P.2d at 1324. 
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With regard to the nature of the discretion of the trial judge, this 
court has stated "if this discretion is reasonably used, and is not 
shown to have been abused, arbitrary, or capricious, the judgment 
of the trial court should not be disturbed", [footnote omitted]. 
State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876 (1975). 
The trial court acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner 
When the trial in this case was originally commenced the court granteo 
a mistrial because Kayle Shaw stated that he had made a prior purchase 
of narcotics from the co-defendant. Such a statement is highly 
prejudicial. The effect of the statements here taken standing alone or 
in combination is just as prejudicial as the statement made that result 
in the first mistrial. The trial court's two decisions cannot be recon 
ciled and consequently must be regarded as arbitrary and capricious. 
The judgment must be reversed and the case remanded to the Third Distri1 
Court for a new trial. 
POINT VI 
IN CLOSING ARGUMENT THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MIS-
CONDUCT BY COMMENTING ON THE CO-DEFENDANI' FAII.TIKZ ID 
TESTIFY A..'l\ffi BY PRESENTING INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO 
THE JURY AND THIS MISCONDUCT RESULTED IN PREJUDICE 
TO THE APPELLANI. 
In the course of the rebuttal portion of the prosecutor's 
argument to the jury, the prosecutor made the following remarks: 
[Kayle Shaw] is given his presumption of innocence 
and that rides with him until he is tried on August 
the 1st. Counsel for some reason opened this and 
I am even very, very reluctant to go into it but it 
is still open. 
He read the instruction about the defendant not 
testifying and not creating a presumption against 
him and he said the reason why the defendant did not 
testify - he said I am a skillful prosecutor and 
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I would have had a chance to cross-examine 
him. No question about that. I would suggest 
that maybe that is the reason. I don't know but, 
you know, Kayle Shaw testified and Kayle Shaw was 
subjected to cross-examination for almost two and 
a half hours by two very skillful attorneys. He 
submitted himself to cross-examination and he 
succeeded. Succeeded one hundred percent in that 
cross-examination. Kayle Shaw is a criminal. I 
don't know, because he had some - he wasn't con-
victed of the offense that he had admitted on the 
stand he committed: The possession of narcotics, 
LSD. Sixty-eight hits of LSD is a heck of a lot 
less than a thousand dollars of Phencyclidine, 
animal tranquilizer, as you heard the chemist 
tesify. A thousand dollars an ounce. Man, how 
many times that could be cut and distributed and 
redistributed. A thousand dollars and it is hard 
to believe that an ounce of any type of - it is 
even more expensive than gold. Pretty expensive 
stuff. 
Well, because Kayle Shaw is caught with sixty-eight 
hits of acid in his car and some marijuana he is 
a "criminal." We are dealing, if I can use the 
phrase, with bigger crooks than Kayle Shaw on a 
thousand dollars an ounce worth of PCP or 
Phencyclidine. (T. 483-484) 
The argument of defense counsel that the prosecutor claimed 
he was responding to was: 
The defendant in any criminal case as the Court has 
informed you has an absolute right not to take the 
stand and testify if he does not want to. That's a 
Constitutional Right and the Court has instructed you 
that the mere fact that a defendant has not availed 
himself of the privilege which the law gives him 
should not prejudice him in any way. It should not 
be considered as any indication either of his guilt or 
his innocence. The failure of the defendant to 
testify is not even a circumstance against him and 
no presumption of guilt can be indulged in the minds 
of the Jury. Why? Because a defendant may be satisfied 
with the evidence as it has been presented. The 
defendant may have other reasons. As you can see, Mr 
Yocum is a skilled prosecutor, a skilled cross-examiner 
and it is - there are numerous reasons why the defendant 
may not want to testify and it is for that reaso~ that 
the law - the Court instructs vou that the law in our 
system of justice is that you may not even assume that 
he is guilty because he as not testifed. The burden at 
all times remains upon the State. (T. 458) 
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Although counsel for the appellant did cormnent on the fact 
that the co-defendant had not taken the stand, he did so within the 
bounds of Constitutional Law. The prosecutor's comments however, were, 
clearly comments intended to cause the jury to draw adverse conclusions 
as to why the defendant did not testify. 
It was an unfavorable comment on the co-defendant's excerci 
I 
I 
of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 1 
In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the Supreme 
Court held that it is a violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination to allow a prosecutor to comment 
in an accused's failure to testify. The reasons that the court gave 
for this holding were that such a comment, if allowed by the courts, 
becomes the equivalent of an offer of evidence; it is also a remanent 
of the inquisitorial system of justice where an accused was forced to 
testify or face a penalty of contempt. Finally, the court reasoned t:.a. 
in allowing such a comment the court would be penalizing a defendant 
in a criminal case for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege. 
In State v. Eaton, 569 P. 2d 1114 (Utah, 1977), this court i 1 
found that a prosecutor's comments that the defense had not presented I 
I 
any evidence was a violation of both the Fifth Amendment to the Unitec 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of 
Utah. With respect to a prosecutor's closing argument the court 
commented, 
We approve and reaffirm that duty and privilege of 
analyzing the whole evidence as a general proposition. 
However, there is a point beyond which it must not 
go in regard to the defendant's constitutional right 
just referred to; and this includes that it should 
not be impaired or destroyed by making comments on 
the failure of the defendant to take the witness 
stand. 569 P.2d at 1116 
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The court went on to distinguish the case of State v. 
~' 540 P.2d 949 (Utah, 1975). In State v. Kazda, supra, the court 
found that the prosecutor has a perogative and a duty to argue all 
1 aspects of the case so long as there is no direct reference to the 
failure to testify. The court then recognized that, 
Upon a fair analysis of the prosecutor's remarks 
here, the conclusion cannot be escaped that it was 
but a thinly disguised attempt to do indirectly what 
the prosecutor knew could not properly be done 
directly: that is, to comment on the fact that the 
defendant had chosen not to take the witness stand; and 
to persuade the jury to draw inferences as to his guilt 
because of his exercise of that constitutional privilege. 
[footnote omitted] 569 P.2d at 1116 
Although counsel for appellant failed to object to this 
I comment this court is not precluded from reviewing this issue. The 
issue is reviewable with a showing of exceptional circumstances, 
State v. Winger, 26 Utah 2d 118, 485 P.2d 1398 (1971). In People v. 
aPerez, 23 Cal. Rptr. 569, 373 P.2d 617 (1962), the Supreme Court of 
California listed two circumstances under which it would review a 
statement made in sUI!llllation for which there had been no objection 
1 
registered. The first of these exceptions arises, 
I 
"Where the case is closely balanced and there is 
g~ave doubt of the defendant's guilt, and the acts 
of misconduct are such as to contribute materially 
to the verdict, a miscarriage of justice results 
requiring a reversal. [Citations omitted] The other 
exception is where the act done or remark made is of 
such character that a harmful result cannot be 
obviated or cured bv an retraction of counsel or 
instruction of the court. In such cases the miscon-
duct will furnish ground for reversal of the judgment, 
even where proper admonitions are given by the court" 
373 P.2d at 627 quoting People v. Lyons, 50 Cal. 2d 245, 
324 P.2d 556 (1958). 
The harm that results from a comment on a defendant's refusal to take 
"he stand is a denial of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
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incrimination. Griffin v. California, supra. Even though the court 
may instruct the jury to disregard the comment, it still has been 
presented to the jury and the juror's attention has been directed to 
it. Psychologically, it would be nearly impossible for a juror to 
disregard such a remark. Consequently, it could be cured neither by 
a retraction nor by an ins true ti on; such an error is subject to revii 
by this court even if there was no objection registered at trial. 
Further error was committed by allowing the prosecutor tc 
read from the transcript of the tape recording of the conversation 
between Kayle Shaw and the co-defendant (T. 478). Counsel objected t: 
this reading (T. 487) because the court had previously refused to adr:t 
the transcript into evidence (T. 333). 
As was previously stated, the general rule is that counsE: 
has both a privilege and a duty to analyze evidence in his argument t:I 
the jury State v. Eaton, supra, State v. Kazda, supra; however, a 
corollary to this rule is that counsel may not present matters to the 
jury which were excluded from evidence. Garris v. United States, 39\1 
F.2d 864 (D.C. 1968); I People v. Perez, supra; People v. Rosenfeld, I 
11 N.Y. 2d 290, 183 N.E. 2d 636 (1962); PeoEle v. Marthole, 51 Ill. ' 
App. 3d 919, 366 N.E. 2d 606 (1977). See also 75 Am. Jur. 2d 331, 
Trials §253. 
The reason why such a presentation is not allowed is that 
1 
the jury may infer that this evidence was available and useful or 
probative, but the defendant has prevented the jury from seeing or 
hearing it. PeoEle v. Gilmer, llO Ill. App. 2d 73, 249 N.Ed. 2d 129 
(1969). The probability that the jurors drew this inference and if :·i; 
I 
is taken in conjunction with the prosecutor's remark that the co-de:'°o e 
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failed to take the stand leaves the strong impression that the defense 
was hiding evidence from the jury. Such an inference, in the context 
of a case of this nature, can have an extremely prejudicial effect, 
Since the whole defense was the co-defendant and the 
appellant had been set up by Kayle Shaw, the inference that the appellant 
'was trying to keep probative evidence from the jury would tend to 
discredit that defense. Since the defense of the appellant was dis-
credited by the error, there is a reasonable probability that there 
would have been a result more favorable to the appellant if these 
: errors had not been committed, State v. Simmons, supra; consequently, 
~1 the error was prejudicial. On this basis, the judgment must be reversed 
and the case remanded to the Third District Court for a new trial. 
' ti 
' 
POINT VII 
THE CUMMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE AFOREMENTIONED 
ERRORS RESULTED IN A DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT 
TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
In State v. St. Clair, supra, this Court found that when 
'\the trial court commits a number of errors, each error in and of itself 
was not prejudicial, the cummulative effect of the erros was prejudicial. 
In the case at hand, Points I through VI all describe errors committed 
by the trial court. If this court finds that none of these errors are 
~ 1 prejudicial in and of themselves then it must consider the commu ative 
effect of the errors. 
The first of the groups of errors connect the appellant 
:9 '.o h t e drug transaction through the co-defendant's hearsay statements. 
: ··l 
· · ~e appellant was precluded from challenging these statements by cross-
,tr-1 
·· examination because of the failure of the trial court to grant a 
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severance. The second group of errors precluded the appellant from 
impeaching Kayle Shaw's testimony by failing to grant a continuance 
and by refusing to make his former attorney testify. This prevented 
the jury from adequately assessing Kayle Shaw's credibility., The thir 
set of errors involved the introduction into evidence of the co-defen~ 
prior bad acts. This evidence allows the jury to infer that the co-
defendant is a bad person and must have sold the narcodics and the 
instruction given to the jury on hearsay (R. 85) would allow the jury 
to apply the testimony against the appellant. The fourth set of erro~ 
relate to the prosecutor's closing argument which left the inference 
that the defense as a whole was concealing evidence from the jury. 
Unquestionably, there is a reasonable probability that this combinati; 
of errors adversely affected the jury's verdict, State v. Simmons, su:1 
The judgment of the court below must be reversed and the case remandec 
to the Third District Court. 
POINT VIII 
THE WARRANT CLAUSE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH PROHIBITS 
UNAUTHORIZED MONITORING BY GOVERNMENT AGENTS OF 
CONVERSATIONS TRANSMITTED BY MEANS OF ELECTRONIC 
DEVICES. 
The appellant moved to suppress a recording of a conversati 
between Gayle Lee Boone and the State's informant, Kayle Shaw, Jr. (R 
The motion was denied and the tape was received into evidence (T. 331; 
The tape was made by recording a broadcast of the conversation trans· 
mitted by an electronic device secreted on the informant's person (T 
The broadcast was heard by some police officers who had followed and 
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were observing Shaw, although there was some question about what they 
heard. 
The State agents who were in charge of Shaw's activities 
:r1 did not bother to obtain a search warrant prior to the transmission 
~and recording of the conversation. Such a failure violated the appellant' 
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures 
guaranteed in Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah and the 
1 Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as it is applied to 
1~ the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This is not to say that officials cannot use such devices and make 
such recordings, but only that before doing so, the authorities must 
:~obtain a warrant issued on the basis of a determination by a neutral 
1:~ and detached magistrate after showing that there is probable cause to 
1r\ believe that a crime is being or will be committed. 
! 
! 
' 
POINT A 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH PROTECT THE PRIVACY 
OF UTAH CITIZENS AND PROHIBIT THE WARRANTLESS 
SURVEILLANCE AND SEIZURE OF THEIR CONVERSATIONS 
THROUGH USE OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES. 
The Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the 
1constitution of Utah protect privacy of people, not specified places, 
1tu Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); State v. Kent, 20 Ut. 2d 
l 1, 432 p. 2d 64 (1967). In other words, there is no need for a physical 
1;i intrusion or trespass to have a violation of this right to privacy. 
In the majority opinion in Katz v. United States, supra, Justice Stewart 
J, described the nature of this right. 
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What a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own home or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection. [citations 
omitted] But what he seeks to preserve as private, 
even in the area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected. [citations omitted] 
389 U.S. at 351-352. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan gave a more detailed descriptio 
of this right of privacy: 
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places." The question, however, 
is what protection it affords to those people. 
Generally, as here, the answer to that question 
requires reference to a "place". My understanding 
of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is 
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation 
of privacy and second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable". 
389 U.S. at 362, Harlan, J. Concurring. 
In Katz v. United States, supra, the Court held that a 
persons's conversations were within this expectation of privacy and 
the overhearing of such conversations constituted a seizure within thf' 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The protection of this aspect of 
privacy is accomplished by means of the warrant clause of the Fourth I 
Amendment (and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah). Tl~ 
purpose of the warrant clause is to place limitations on official 
activities. These limitations include: The requirement that officiali 
must present their estimate of probable cause for the detached scrutir,7 
of a neutral magistrate. Secondly, during a search, a warrant compel' 
officers to observe precise limits established in advance by specific 
court order. Finally, after the search has been conducted officers 
will be required to notify an authorized magistrate of all that has 
been seized. 
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I 
'.~ 
In Katz v. United States, supra, a transmitter was placed 
in a phone booth enabling police to overhear the defendant's conversations 
Even though it was operated only when the defendant was using the phone 
and in a limited means, the court refused to uphold the search stating: 
[T]his Court has never sustained a search upon the 
sole ground that officers reasonably expected to 
find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily 
confined their activities to the least intrusive 
means consistent with that end. 389 U.S. at 356-357. 
As noted above this Court also recognizes that the Fourth 
Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah are 
aimed at the protection of a person's privacy. State v. Kent, supra. 
Furthermore, by enacting Utah Code Ann. §76-9-402 (1973), the State 
legislature has recognized the need to protect the privacy of people. 
This statute provides: 
76-9-402. Privacy violation - (1) A person is guilty 
of privacy violation if, except as authorized by law, 
he: (a) Trespasses on property with intent to subject 
anyone to eavesdropping or other surveillance in a 
private place; or 
(b) Installs in any private place, without the 
consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy 
there, any device for observing, photographing, 
recording, amplifying, or broadcasting sounds or 
events in the place or uses any such unauthorized 
installation; or (c) Installs or uses outside of a private place 
any device for hearing, recording, amplifying, or 
broadcasting sounds originating in the place which 
would not ordinarily be audible or comprehensible 
outside, without the consent of the person or persons 
entitled to privacy there. 
(2) Privacy violation is a Class B misdemeanor. 
An important aspect of this statute is the exception of 
"except as authorized by law". Obviously, this is intended to allow 
such invasions of privacy if done by judicial authorization a valid 
search warrant. 
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POINT B 
A CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM WARRANTLESS 
SURVEILLANCE AND SEIZURE OF HIS CONVERSATIONS 
THROUGH USE OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES IS NOT WAIVED 
MERELY BECAUSE SUCH CONVERSATION IS WITH A 
GOVERNMENT AGENT. 
m 
In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) the Suprem11t 
Court was faced with a fact situation very similar to the case at hant 0 
Four of the justices distinguished Katz v. United States, supra, and t 
upheld the search; Justice Black concurred on the basis of his disse:1a 
in Katz v. United States, supra, (he believed that the Fourth Amendme:IF 
applied only to tangible, not comm.unicative evidence). Justice Brenn~ 
refused to apply Katz v. Unites States, supra, retroactively, and 
Justice Harlan authored a strong dissent that the two other justices c 
concurred in. 
The basic argument of Justice White's plurality opinion i;l 1 
the the petitioner had waived the protection of his privacy by talkin;I 
to a third person, who incidentally was wired to boradcast the conver·. 
sation to government agents. To be able to reach this conclusion the:, 
case of Katz v. United States, supra, had to be distinguished. Justi:~ 
White found two distinguishing factors: (1) in Katz neither party tt 1 
the conversations knew that the government was eavesdropping; and (1;, 
even in Katz there was no justifiable and constituttionally protected 
expectation that the person with whom one is conversing will not later 
reveal the conversation to the police. To support this second dis- I 
tinguishing feature Justice White cited Lopez v. United States, 373 d 
427 (1963), Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), and Hoff~ 
United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). The theme that Justice White 
erroneously extracted from these three cases was that the Fourth Ameni· 
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1ent does not protect a person from "misplaced confidence" in a friend 
,r informer. He then went on to hold that if the conduct and revelations 
Jf an undercover agent do not invade one's "consitutionally justifiable 
~xpectations of privacy," then a simultaneous recording or electronic 
:ransmission to others likewise does not invade one's privacy. Stated 
Jtherwise, "a constitutional license to employ secret agents generates 
:he correlative right to electronically eavesdrop without prior judicial 
mthorization." Comment, Electronic Eavesdropping and the Right to 
Privacy, 52 Boston University Law Review 831 (1972). 
There are two problems with Justice White's opinion: The 
first is that he misstated the legal basis that leads to his conclusion 
of waiver; the second is that he fails to correctly analyze the 
interests that are at stake. The misstated legal basis will be discussed 
first. 
The case that Justice White cites to stand for the proposition 
that electronic devices such as recorders and transmitters will not 
constitute an invasion of privacy is Lopez v. United States, supra. In 
that case the defendant was found guilty of attempting to bribe a 
government agent. The offer of the bribe had been recorded by the agent 
who had a hidden recording device on his person at the time of the offer. 
Two of the major factors that the court found to be the basis of its 
holding were that at the time the recording was being made it was not 
being transmitted to third persons and secondly, the defendant had 
assumed the risk of government intrusion because he was attempting to 
bribe a person who he knew to be a government agent. Obviously, the 
factual basis of the holding in this case is clearly distinguishable 
from the facts both in United States v. White, supra, and the facts in 
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the case at bar. In both United States v. White, supra, and in the 
case at hand the conversations were broadcast to third persons and 
in both there was no expectation of direct governmental involvement. 
In both Lewis v. United States, supra, and in Hoffa v. 
United States, supra, the court based its decision on a trespass analisl 
That type of analysis had been strongly rejected in Katz v. United 
States, supra. In Hoffa the court held that an informer who was an 
invited guest could not be found to have committed a trespass (at tha:
1 
time Fourth Amendment questions were analyzed in terms of trespass). 
It is doubtful, however, under the trespass analysis that the invitato 
would have extended to uninvited third party government agents who we:e 
listening by means of electronic devices. 
In Lewis v. United States, supra, a government agent pur· 
chased narcotics at the defendant's residence then arrested him. The! 
court held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect one who volunta:~ 
converts a constitutionally protected area into a commercial center. 
This case did not involve any ele~tronic transmitters or recorders. 
It did not even involve any connnunications to third parties. It si111]1:11 
is not applicable as a legal basis for the holding in United States v I 
White , supra. 
The analytical problems with 'United States v. White, supr: 
are discussed in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion. Justice White'' 
opinion is analytically incorrect with respect to his interpretation:' 
both the privacy and waiver issues. The privacy question will be dis· I 
cussed first. 
The first problem with White's analysis of the privacy '.sl 
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is that the interests simply are not the same when there is a misplaced 
1
confidence in an individual who turns out to be an informant, and when 
1 a conversation is electronically broadcast to third persons who are 
government agents. Typically, when one person engages another in 
11 conversation there are two considerations: who will hear the conversa-
tion and how will the conversation be reported to others. Before 
entering a conversation of a private nature the speaker will usually 
I analyze these concerns in terms of his subjective belief that the 
listener will not broadcast the content of this conversation to others 
land his knowledge of the credibility of the listener (in case the listener 
~does make such a broadcast). If there is a substantial risk that 
conversations expected to be private are boradcast to third persons, 
an individual's freedom to make his own choice of who he will speak with 
I and what he will say will be substantially impaired. 
Likewise, if people are subject to the fear that their 
'conversations will be broadcast to government agents other interests 
will be affected. These interests were eloquently described by Justice 
i 
'I Harlan in his dissenting opinion in United States v. White, supra. 
I description is well worth repeating: 
The impact of the practice of third-party 
bugging, must, I think, be considered such as to 
undermine that confidence and sense of security 
in dealing with one another that is characteristic 
of individual relationships between citizens in a 
free society. It goes beyond the impact on privacy 
occasioned by the ordinary type of "informer" 
investigation upheld in Lewis and Hoffa. The 
argument of the plurality opinion, to the effect 
that it is irrelevant whether secrets are revealed by 
the mere tattletale or the transistor, ignores the 
differences occasioned by third-party monitoring 
and recording which insures full and accurate disclosure 
of all that is said, free of the possibili~y of error 
and oversight that inheres in human reporting. 
- 47 -
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Authority is hardly required to support the JI 
proposition that words would be measured a good deal 
more carefully and corranunication inhibited if one i1 
suspected his conversations were being transmitted 
and transcribed. Were third-party bugging a prevalent :1 
practice, it might well smother that spontaneity 
reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious, i1 
offhand exchange is easily forgotten and one may 
count on the obscurity of his remarks, protected by 
the very fact of a limited audience, and the like-
lihood that the listener will either overlook or 
forget what is said, as well as the listener's 
inability to reformulate a conversation without values 
are sacrificed by a rule of law that permits official 
monitoring of private discourse limited only by the 
need to locate a willing assistant [footnote omitted] 
401 U.S. at 787-789, Harlan J. dissenting. 
Another significant effect of this fear of third person 
official monitoring is that people will lose an important medium for 
relieving social tension. Tension is often relieved by such things a> 
making idle threats, boasting about fictitious acts or even falsely 
claiming responsibility for the commission of well publicized crimes. i 
In such conversation little harm is done, and it serves as a healthy 
outlet for various tensions. But if the conversation is suppressed 
the tensions will remain, and these tensions will be compounded by the, 1 
belief that any comment may be overheard by some government agent. I= 
To say there will be chilling effect on the exercise of free speach 
would be an understatement. The Orwellian nightmare of 1984 will bee~' 
a cruel reality. In any conversation it would become reasonable to 
believe that there are government agents listening somewhere. The 
protection that is built into our federal and state constitutions aga:n 
such omnipresence is the warTant clause of the Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah which prohibits seari 
and seizures without a warrant. The protection simply is that gove~; 
agents must show to a neutral and detached magistrate that there is 
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~robable cause to believe that a crime is being or will be connnitted 
\efore government agents are allowed to listen to a person's personal 
:onversations by means of a transmitter attached to the body of an 
informant. 
Some might argue that the government may act with self 
restraint and respect for privacy. This argument was expressly rejected 
in Katz v. United States, supra. The Fourth Amendment was not premised 
on good faith and self-restraint of the police. The Fourth Amendment 
was premised on the abuses of power in King George's writs of assistance 
during Colonial times. The Fourth Amendment functions as a check on 
the abuses of authority and the worst tendancies of government. 
With respect to the waiver question, Justice White's analysis 
1inges on the underlying proposition that a risk of bugging will have 
"o behavioral effect on a person contemplating a crime once he decides 
to trust a confederate. His argument is in terms of the typical criminal. 
This breaks down when it is the innocent citizen that is used as the 
i model. With an innocent citizen the risks of surveillance are not 
!assumed by the actor. The risks come to that actor when the police 
decide to "bug" an informer. This means that an unconventional behavior 
~as well as behavior that is on the borderline of illegality will arouse 
the curiosity of the authorities. Once that curiosity is aroused the 
authorities are allowed to attach a transmitter to a confidant of the 
1~speaker and listen to any and all conversations that their suspect engages: 
in. This can be done even if there is little or no reason to believe 
1rcthat there is any criminal activity involved. 
Such imposition of hidden and unforeseen risks on the cit-
'.enry were expressly prohibited by Katz v. United States, supra. 
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Following the analysis in Katz it is reasonable to assume that a pers01 
speaking to another about possible criminal activities subjectively 
does not expect that other person to broadcast the content of the 
conversation to third persons. However, using a reasonable person tesi 
it is quite likely that the content of the conversation will be told 
to others. But it is quite unlikely that any reasonable person would 
believe that his conversation is being simultaneously broadcast to 
some government agents simply because he reveals information to a pen( 
in whom he has misplaced his trust. 
POINT C 
EFFECTIVE POLICE INVESTIGATION IS NOT HAMPERED 
BY REQUIRING THAT A WARRANT BE OBTAINED BEFORE 
GOVERNMENT AGENTS CAN ENGAGE IN THIRD PERSON 
MONITORING; CONSEQUENTLY ANY SUCH MONITORING 
WITHOUT A WARRANT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
In People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975), 
the Supreme Court of Michigan rejected Justice White's analysis and 
legal basis in United States v. White, supra, and held that a warrant 
must be obtained before government agents could monitor conversations 
between an informant and a suspect if any evidence of that conversatior 
other than the informant's version, is to be used in court. The 
Michigan court accepted Justice Harlan's view that a person's expectati 
of privacy should not be subject to the possibility that communication1 
directed to particular persons are simultaneously being intercepted bv 
third party government agents. It is also important to note that 
the Michigan Legislature has enacted provisions in its penal 
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13 
code that are similar to those of Utah Code Annotated §76-9-402 
14 (1973). The same primary interests receive protection in both Utah 
and Michigan. 
Most of this argument has dealt with the probability of 
I abuse if this type of surveillance is not subjected to the warrant 
requirement. Undoubtedly, the government will argue that this type 
of surveillance is necessary for police investigation. There is no 
1 question that this technique is necessary for investigation. However, 
the government officials are not the people who should make the determina-
13. §28.807(2) Tresspassing for eavesdropping or surveillance rm;vses] Sec. 539b. 
A person who trespasses on property owned or Ui1der the control o any other person, 
to subject that person to eavesdropping or surveillance is guilty of a misdaneanor. 
§28.807(3) U~ device to eave~upon conversation] Se. 539c. Any person 
who is present or is not present a private conversation and who willfully 
uses any device to eavesdrop upon the conversation without the consent of all parties 
thereto, or who knowingly aids, employs or procures another person to do the same in 
violation of this section, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisomnent in 
a state prison for not IIDre than 2 years or by a fine of not IIDre than $2, 000 or both. 
§28.807(4) Installing surveillance or eavesdropping devices] Sec. 539d. Any 
person who installs in any private place, withOUt the consent of the person or 
persons entitled to privacy there, any device for observing, photographing, or 
eavesdropping upon the sounds or events in such place, or uses any such unauthorized 
installation, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisomnent in a state prison 
. for not IIDre than 2 years or by a fine of not IIDre than $2, 000 or both. 
14. 76-9-402. Privacy violation. - (1) A person is guilty of privacy violation 
if, except as authorized by law, he: 
1 
(a) Trespasses on property with intent to subject anyone to eavesdropping or 
other surveillance in a private place; or 
(b) Installs in any private place, without the consent of the person or 
persons entitled to privacy there, any device for observing, photographing, recording, 
amplifying, or broadcasting sounds or events in the place of uses any such unauthorized 
installation; or 
(c) Installs or uses outside of a private place any device for hearing, recording, 
amplifying, or broadcasting sounds originating in the place which would not ordinarily i 
'be audible or canprehensible outside, without the consent of the person or persons ' 
entitled to privacy there. 
(2) Privacy violation is a Class B mis~r. 
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tion of which people will be subjected to surveillance. The Fourth St 
Amendment requires that such a determination will ultimately be made a 
by a neutral and detached magistrate. The magistrate can make an co 
objective detErmination of whether the government agents have probable 
cause to believe that a crime is being committed. This is the means 
by which our founding fathers saw fit to curb the abuses of the English 
monarchy - such abuses, incidentally, were a major cause of the 
Revolutionary War. In the case at hand, the fact that a warrant was 
not obtained must be taken as an admission of lack of probable cause 
at the time the drug buy was supposed to have taken place. The govern· In 
ment agents had taken elaborate precautions to set up a drug buy. The re< 
buy was set up in advance through the informant (T. 171). The informan 
was subjected to a skin search and search of his vehicle. The electron 
transmitter was taped to his body (T. 173). The agents made photocopie 
of all the bills that were to be used in the purchase (T. 175). The 
informant was searched a second time, and the money was counted a 
second time when the informant left the gym to get something to eat 
(T. 180). Finally, there were about a dozen other officers in six car~ 
monitoring the conversation (T. 174). With all of these elaborate 
precautions the government agents did not see fit to obtain a warrant· 
a very simple procedure if there is in fact probable cause to believe 
a crime is being or will be committed. Stated otherwise, the governmet 
agents took elaborate precautions to protect the interests of the 
State, but did not even take the slightest precaution to protect the 
constitutional rights of Boone or the appellant. 
The reasonableness of not obtaining a warrant prior to 
conducting a search is determined by balancing the interests of the 
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State against those interests that an individual has in requiring that 
a warrant be obtained. State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125 (Utah, 1977). The 
compeating interests were described in State v. Beavers, supra; 
We are acutely sensitive to the fundamental 
interests involved when prevailing law enforcement 
techniques are balanced against protections guaranteed 
citizens under the state and Federal constitutions. 
With the advent of increasingly sophisticated 
electronic surveillance equipment, the evolving body 
of law which seeks to reconcile the need for effective 
police investigative practices in combatting criminal 
activity with the ominous spectre of the Orwellian 
Big Brother is fraught with complexities. 227 N.W. 
2d at 514. 
In resolving these two conflicting interests the Michigan court then 
reasoned; 
Participant monitoring is practiced extensively 
throughout the country and represents a vitally impor-
tant investigative tool of law enforcement. Equally 
significant is the security and confidence enjoyed 
by our citizenry in knowing that the risk of intrusion 
by this type of electronic surveillance is subject to 
the constitutional protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. By interposing the search warrant 
requirement prior to engaging in participant monitoring, 
the risk that one's conversation is being intercepted 
is rightfully limited to circumstances involving a 
party whose conduct has provided probable cause to an 
independent magistrate to suspect such party's involve-
ment in illegal activity. The warrant requirement is 
not a burdensome formality designed to protect those 
who would engage in illegal activity, but, rather a 
procedure which guarantees a measure of privacy and 
personal security to all citizens. The interests of 
both society and the individual should not rest upon 
the exercise of the unerring judgment and self-
restraint of law enforcement officials. Our laws must 
ensure that the ordinary, law-abiding citizen may 
continue to engage in private discourse, free to sp7ak. 
with the uninhibited spontanceity that is characteristic 
of our democratic society. 227 N.W. 2d at 515. 
Absent a specific finding of probable cause either in the 
:ssuance of a warrant or in a pre-trial suppression motion the seizure 
f this evidence must be deemed to be unreasonable. Furthermore, 
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this court is prohibited from reviewing the record at the trial to 
find probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). Consequent~. 
the tape recording used in the trial constituted a violation of the 
appellant's Fourth Amendment rights. The tape must have been 
suppressed. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
The appellant in the case at hand has standing to suppress. 
this evidence because it was obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. The reasons why the appellant has standing are that: 
The fruits of this unlawful search - the tape recording - were used 
against the appellant. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
The appellant's co-defendant, Boone, had a reasonable expectation of 
freedom from governmental intrusion, Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364 
(1968). Finally, this evidence was obtained in the course of a govern-
ment investigation ultimately to be used against the appellant at trial 
15 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). Since this evidence 
was all that tied the appellant to the drug sale its use is not harmles: 
beyond a reasonable doubt so the use of the evidence was prejudicial, 
Chapman v. California, supra. The case must be remanded to the District 
Court for a new trial. 
15. The majority of the court in Alderman v. United States, supra, held that 
the only people who have standing to suppress are those Whose rights are aggrieved. 
However-, this is clearly erroneous as the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 
14 of the Constitution of Utah are general prohibitions on unreasonable searches 
and seizures. Furtherm:rre, the general policy behind the exclusionary rule is 
to deter illegal police practices, Mapp v. Ohio, supra. Such a policy is not 
furthered by the use of the evidence against any co-defendant in a criminal case· 
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CONCLUSION 
The use of the tape recording of the transaction between 
the appellant and Kayle Shaw violated the appellant's rights guaranteed 
by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah which resulted in a denial of 
appellant's right to a fair trial. All the other errors were reviewed 
in Point VII. When the cummulative effect of these errors is considered 
the reversal of the trial court's judgment is mandated. 
DATED this day of March, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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